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A "STANDING" AMENDMENT TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE*
DANIEL 0. BERNSTINE**
The doctrine of standing is one of "the most amorphous [concepts]"
in American law.' Generally, plaintiffs must have standing to sue in
the federal courts,2 and whenever a court determines that the plaintiff
lacks standing, it will dismiss the action.3 This rule derives from the
view that article three of the Constitution4 requires that plaintiffs have
standing to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.'
Because a court must dismiss any action over which it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction,6 the plaintiff must have standing to give rise to a
justiciable claim.
The law of standing has gone through significant change and devel-
opment in the last decade.' To date, however, legal literature on the
* The author wishes to thank Maureen A. Molony, a second-year student at the University
of Wisconsin Law School, for her research and assistance in the preparation of this article.
** Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. A.B., 1969, University of Cal-
ifornia, Berkeley; J.D., 1972, Northwestern University School of Law; LL.M., 1975, University of
Wisconsin Law School.
1. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1967) (citing Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judciari' Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 498 (statement of Profes-
sor Paul A. Freund)).
2. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Association of Data Processing Orgs.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1967); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962).
3. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975): United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166
(1974); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.& 727 (1972); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
4. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 provides:
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this consti-
tution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to
all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United
States shall be a party: to controversies between two or more states, between citizens of
different States, between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grant of different
States, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects.
5. See notes 9-38 infra and accompanying text.
6. FED. R. Cir. P. 12(h)(3) states: "Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."
See also City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341
U.S. 6 (1951); Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swan, Ill U.S. 379 (1884).
7. See generall, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
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doctrine has focused primarily on the substantive parameters of the
principle and the standards for determining the standing of certain
categories of individual and group plaintiffs. The procedural implica-
tions of the doctrine's evolution have been largely ignored. In particu-
lar, a crucial procedural question remains unanswered: Does article
three necessarily require that a federal court dismiss a suit whenever it
finds that the plaintiff lacks standing, even after it has rendered an
otherwise valid judgment on the merits of the claim?
This article examines the constitutional and prudential policies un-
derlying the standing requirement, and concludes that a federal court
may render a valid judgment when the defendant fails to raise the
standing issue prior to judgment. Accordingly, this article proposes
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be amended to preclude a
defendant from asserting any defense based on plaintiff's lack of stand-
ing once the court has determined the merits of the claim.
I. THE STANDING DOCTRINE: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AND
PRUDENTIAL DIMENSIONS
Flast v. Cohen9 set the modem standard for determining whether a
plaintiff has standing. Plaintiff-taxpayers brought suit to enjoin the ex-
penditure of federal funds under the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); United
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Association of Data Processing Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
8. See Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate/or
Claim/or Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Bittker, The Case of the Fictitious Taxpayer, 36 U. CHI.
L. REV. 364 (1969); Bledsoe, Mootness and Standing-In Class Actions, I FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 430
(1973); Davis, The Case of the Real Taxpayer. 4 Reply to Professor Bittker, 36 U. CI. L. REV. 375
(1969); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1971); Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public
Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or IdeologicalPlaintif, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968); Scott, Stand.
ing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973); Sedler, Standing to
Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962); Tushnet, The New
Law of Standing: 4 Pleafor Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977); Zacharias, Standing
of Public Interest Litigating Groups to Sue on Behalf of Their Members, 39 U. PrT. L, REV. 453
(1978); Note, Taxpayer Standing to Litigate, 61 GEo. L.J. 747 (1973); Comment, The Burger
Court's Approach to Jus Tertii Standing, 13 GONZ. L. REV. 961 (1978); Note, Standing to Assert
ConstitutionalJus Tertii, 88 HARv. L. REV. 423 (1972); Comment, Associational Third-Party Stand.
ing and Federal Jurisdiction Under Hunt, 64 IOWA L. REV. 104 (1978); Comment, Standing to Sue
in Federal Courts: The Elimination of Preliminary Threshold Standing Inquiries, 51 TUL. L, REV.
119 (1976).
9. 392 U.S. 83 (1967).
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cation Act of 1965,10 claiming that the use of federal funds by religious
schools to finance education and purchase textbooks violates the estab-
lishment clause of the Constitution.' A three-judge district court dis-
missed the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs, in their role as
federal taxpayers, did not have standing to sue,12 but the Supreme
Court reversed. 3 Confronted with the issue of whether the district
court "was simply imposing a rule of self-restraint which was not con-
stitutionally compelled,"' 4 the Court held that standing is an aspect of
the justiciability requirement imposed by article three of the Constitu-
tion.'5 The party seeking relief must allege "such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for the illumination of difficult constitutional ques-
tions."' 6 To establish standing, a taxpayer must demonstrate a nexus
between his status as a taxpayer and the legislative act under attack as
well as a nexus between his taxpayer status and a specific constitutional
limitation on the congressional spending power.
17
The standing cases since Flast resemble a labyrinth of analytically
questionable decisions,' but the basic constitutional consideration un-
derlying the standing doctrine has remained consistent: whether the
plaintiff has a sufficient interest in the outcome of the litigation to pres-
ent the case in the adversary context required by article three. t9
10. Pub. L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 36 (1965) (amended 1966, 1967, 1970) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 20 U.S.C.).
11. 392 U.S. at 85-86. The establishment clause provides: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion ..... " U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
12. Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
13. 392 U.S. 83 (1967).
14. Id. at 92.
15. Id. at 102.
16. Id. at 99 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
17. Id. at 102.
18. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972).
Critics charge that the Court's standing decisions represent an attempt to close the doors of the
federal courts, see Styne & Van Aken, Warth v. Seldin: The Substantial Probability Test, 3 HAS-
TINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 485, 516 (1976), to avoid decisions on the merits of controversial cases, see
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 66 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting), and to render concealed decisions on
the merits by denying standing when the the Court deems a claim to be not meritorious, see
Tushnet, supra note 8.
19. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin,
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Prudential considerations also underpin the standing doctrine. In
Warth v. Seldin20 petitioners sought declaratory and injunctive relief
from a town ordinance that effectively excluded low and moderate in-
come persons from in-town living. The district court dismissed the
complaint, finding that petitioners did not have standing to prosecute
the action, and the court of appeals affirmed." Justice Powell, writing
for the Court, noted that a litigant is entitled to a decision on the merits
of his claim when he makes out a "case or controversy" between him-
self and the defendant within the meaning of article three.2 2 Even
when a plaintiff satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement, however,
he must rest his claim for relief on his own legal rights and interests,
not on those of third parties.23 Because petitioners in War/h alleged
injury only to unidentified members of a class they purported to repre-
sent, they lacked standing to assert the unconstitutionality of the ordi-
nance.
24
Prudential concerns also entered into the Court's decision in Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization.25 Plaintiffs, named in-
digents and organizations composed of indigents, brought a class action
against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of the In-
ternal Revenue Service, claiming that defendants violated the Internal
Revenue Code and the Administrative Procedure Act in their issuance
of a revenue ruling that granted advantageous tax treatment to non-
profit hospitals that offered only emergency room service to indigents.
The Court held that neither plaintiff-organizations nor plaintiff-individ-
uals had standing to sue.26 Despite the organizations' interest in the
health problems of their indigent members, the organizations had not
demonstrated "injury in fact" as required by article three.27 Plaintiff
individuals, even assuming that they had been denied hospital services,
422 U.S. 490 (1975); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). But see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 64 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (majority needlessly based its deci-
sion on article three); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J.,
concurring) (article three case or controversy created by statute).
20. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
21. 495 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1974).
22. 422 U.S. at 498.
23. Id. at 499.
24. Id. at 504-08. See also Note, Associational Third Party Standing and Federal Jurisdiction
Under Hunt, 64 IowA L. Rev. 104 (1978).
25. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
26. Id. at 28.
27. Id. at 40.
[Vol. 1979:501
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also lacked standing because no hospital was made a party defendant
in the proceeding.28
In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,29
however, the Court, in one of its most recent pronouncements on stand-
ing, permitted citizens groups and individuals who lived near the site of
a proposed nuclear power plant to sue the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission for a declaratory judgment that the Price-Anderson Act,30
which limited the liability of public utilities for nuclear accidents re-
sulting from the operation of federally licensed nuclear power plants,
was unconstitutional. In discussing the prudential considerations un-
derlying the standing doctrine, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
There are good and sufficient reasons for this prudential limitation on
standing when rights of third parties are implicated-the avoidance of the
adjudication of rights which those not before the Court may not wish to
assert, and the assurance that the most effective advocate of the rights at
issue is present to champion them. We do not, however, find these rea-
sons a satisfactory predicate for applying this limitation or a similar nexus
requirement to all cases as a matter of course. Where a party champions
his own rights, and where the injury alleged is a concrete and particular-
ized one which will be prevented or redressed by the relief requested, the
basic practical and prudential concerns underlying the standing doctrine
are generally satisfied when the constitutional requisites are met.
31
In sum, whatever the standard-personal stake in the outcome,32 in-
jury-in-fact, 33 economic harm,34 or otherwise-the Supreme Court re-
gards standing as an element of the article three justiciability require-
ment. Though the Court has imposed different standing requirements
for different types of plaintiffs-taxpayer, 5 environmentalist,36 or busi-
28. "[Tlhe 'case or controversy' limitation of Art. III still requires that a federal court act only
to redress injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action ofthe defendant, and not injury
that results from the independent action of some third party not before the court."
Id. at 41-42. (emphasis added).
29. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1970) (amended 1975).
31. 438 U.S. at 80-81 (citations omitted).
32. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1967); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
33. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Schlesinger v. Reserv-
ists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Association of Data Processing Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970).
34. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
35. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States
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ness competitor37--standing is regarded as essential to invoke the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. Furthermore, the concept
of standing is inextricably intertwined with concerns over the proper
role of the federal judiciary. In cases in which courts doubt the "con-
crete adverseness" of the action-such as when plaintiffs alleged a gen-
eralized injury,38 or fail to name a defendant necessary to the granting
of proper relief' 9-- the courts, for prudential reasons, probably will find
that plaintiffs lack standing.40
II. THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION: VALIDITY OF JUDGMENTS
ENTERED PRIOR TO DEFENDANTS' CHALLENGE TO
PLAINTIFFS' STANDING
4 1
The federal courts derive their sole adjudicatory authority from the
Constitution and acts of Congress. 42 The parties to an action cannot
confer jurisdiction on the court by either consent43 or collusion.44 A
federal court, therefore, must dismiss any suit over which it lacks sub-
ject matter jurisdiction at whatever point in the litigation that the juris-
dictional defect becomes evident.45 A defendant may wait until after
the trial court has rendered an unfavorable judgment on the merits of
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1967); Frothingham v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1923).
36. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study, 438 U.S. 59 (1978); United States
v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
37. See Association of Data Processing Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
38. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
39. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
40. When Congress, however, confers standing on a particular category of persons to litigate
constitutional or statutory claims, the courts will honor the congressional determination even
when prudential considerations otherwise would not allow a decision on the merits. See United
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Association of Data Processing Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970). Nevertheless, plaintiffs must still satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement of the
standing doctrine. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
41. For an excellent discussion of the problems and theories relating to the validity of
judgments, see Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REv. 491 (1967); Dobbs, Trial Court Error as an Excess of
Jurisdiction, 43 TEx. L. REv. 854 (1965).
42. See notes 4-8 supra and accompanying text, See also Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260
U.S. 226 (1922); 13 C. WRIGHT & F. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522
(1973).
43. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Jackson v. Ashton, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 148 (1834); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
44. See Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823 (1969); 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1976).
45. See note 6 supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/8
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the claim to challenge for the first time on appeal the court's jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter of the dispute.46 In addition, a court either
at trial or on appeal may raise the issue sua sponte and dismiss the
action if the jurisdictional defect is present.47
This rule, which allows a subject matter jurisdiction defect to be
raised at any point during the litigation, is troubling when it operates to
upset an otherwise valid judgment on the merits.48 When a defendant
appears at trial and challenges the plaintiffs standing, but the trial
court rules against him on the issue and proceeds to the merits of the
claim, the rule is appropriate. Like any other issue, the defendant
should have recourse to attack the judgment either by motion in the
court that rendered the judgment 49 or by appeal of the judgment to the
46. See note 6 and accompanying text: cf. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6
(1951) (diversity jurisdiction). In Finn, defendant waited until after the district court decided the
merits of the case to claim for the first time on appeal that the case had been improperly removed
to federal court because no diversity jurisdiction existed. The Supreme Court sustained the chal-
lenge:
To permit a federal trial court to enter a judgment in a case removed without right from
a state court where the federal court could not have original jurisdiction of the suit even
in the posture it had at the time of judgment, would by the act of the parties work a
wrongful extension of federal jurisdiction and give district courts power the Congress
had denied them.
Id. at 18.
47. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967); McGrath v. Kristensen,
340 U.S. 162 (1950); King Bridge v. Otoe County, 120 U.S. 225 (1887); Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry.
v. Swan, IIl U.S. 379 (1884); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
48. Professor Moore criticizes the rule on its premise:
With deference, we question whether such an inflexible rule [that federal jurisdiction
can never, except under express statutory provisions, arise from consent or estoppel] is
needed or sound. The federal courts, it is true, are courts of limited jurisdiction. Juris-
diction represents the distribution of judicial power in our federal system as blueprinted
by the Constitution and declared by Congress; and the federal courts ought therefore to
be mindful that they stay within defined limits. These are broad working principles and
ought not to be applied destructively. Where all the parties have colluded to manufac-
ture jurisdiction, the action should be dismissed at any stage when this fact is discovered.
The colluding parties deserve no sympathy and may properly be dealt with in a stem
manner. If a jurisdictional objection is made before trial it should normally be
respected; and the district court should have the power to raise lack of jurisdiction on its
own motion so long as the case pends before it, although wisdom would not demand an
inflexible use after a hearing or trial on the merits. In our opinion, it is very questionable
whether a party who has invoked the federal court's jurisdiction should be allowed to
raise lack of federal jurisdiction after he has lost on the merits. And only in rare cases
should an appellate court on its own motion raise lack of the district court's jurisdiction.
I MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.60[4] (2d ed. 1979) (footnotes omitted).
See Morse, Judicial Self-Denial and Judicial Restraint: The Personality of the Original Jurisdic-
tion of the District Courts, 3 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 101 (1955), 4 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 7 (1955).
49. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59, 60(b)(4). See generally Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601
(1949). Under certain circumstances a defendant may also bring an independent action in equity
Washington University Open Scholarship
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court with appellate jurisdiction over the case.50 If the appellate court
also upholds the plaintiffs standing, then the defendant is precluded
from further direct attack on the judgment absent review by the
Supreme Court." When the defendant raises the standing issue after a
judgment on the merits, however, the rule commands less support. 2
When a plaintiff satisfies "the basic practical and prudential concerns
underlying the standing doctrine,"53 there is little reason to upset the
judgment.
At least one court has upheld a judgment even though the plaintiff
lacked standing. In Forsythe v. Overmeyer54 plaintiff sued to recover on
defendant's personal guarantee under a sale-lease back agreement.
Only after the trial court reached a decision on the merits did defend-
ant challenge plaintiffs standing to sue.5  The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit summarily dismissed the challenge without discussion of
the merits of defendant's motion. 6 Although the implication of For-
sythe is clear that a defendant who loses on the merits at trial will not
be allowed to later assert plaintiffs lack of standing to attack an other-
wise valid judgment, the decision may be read in either of two ways.
First, the case may be read to hold that standing is not a prerequisite to
the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. If, as according to
Flast, standing is a requirement of subject matter jurisdiction, then the
judgment in Forsythe should have been indefinitely subject to attack
and the Forsythe court would have had to decide the issue, even at the
appellate stage, and dismiss the complaint if plaintiff lacked standing to
sue. If, however, standing is not essential to the proper exercise of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, then the Forsythe court could have appropri-
ately proceeded to the merits of the case before it determined its subject
matter jurisdiction.
to enjoin the enforcement of a void judgment. See Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915).
See also 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 60.37[l] (2d ed. 1979).
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 92, 97 (1971). See also Jackson
v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U.S. 494, 503 (1940).
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 92,97 (1971). See also Durfee v.
Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938).
52. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, Explanatory Notes § 15, at 128 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1978). See also Hartog v. Memory, 116 U.S. 588 (1966); 53 HARv. L. REV. 652 (1940).
53. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 81 (1978);
see notes 20-31 supra and accompanying text.
54. 576 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1978).
55. Id. at 784.
56. Id.
[Vol. 1979:501
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Alternatively, Forsythe's summary rejection of defendant's motion to
dismiss for lack of standing may be read to support the proposition that
at some point during the litigation--certainly, after trial on the mer-
its-a defendant may be deemed to have waived his defense of lack of
standing, even though standing is a requirement for the subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts. This view avoids direct conflict with
Flast, yet recognizes the acceptability of defendant's waiver of the right
to challenge plaintiffs' standing when the prudential concerns underly-
ing the standing doctrine have been satisfied.
In Thurston v. Dekle,57 for example, a district court awarded back
pay as well as declaratory and injunctive relief to a discharged city em-
ployee who challenged the defendant-city's suspension and dismissal
rules."x The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that while plaintiff
had standing to assert a claim for back pay, the district court was not
the appropriate forum to adjudicate the claim.59 The court of appeals
also held that plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the city's sus-
pension and dismissal rules, but ruled that the district court properly
reached the merits of plaintiffs challenge to these rules.60 The court
reasoned that the probability of another attack on the city rules by a
plaintiff with standing and the concrete adversary context apparent
throughout the present proceeding outweighed the procedural techni-
cality that plaintiff lacked standing.6'
Forsthe and Thurston thus stand for the proposition that a federal
57. 383 F. Supp. 1167 (M.D. Fla.), rev'd inpart, 531 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated on
other grounds, 98 S. Ct. 3118 (1978).
58. 383 F. Supp. at 1181-82.
59. 531 F.2d at 1269.
60. Id. at 1270.
61. Id. at 1270-01. See also First Nat'l City Bank v. Saks Constr. Corp., 70 F.R.D. 417
(D.V.I. 1976); Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 1974).
This rationale resembles that used by courts to avoid problems of mootness resulting from
changes in the facts or the law that deprive the litigant of a sufficient stake in the outcome. See,
eg.. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in which the Court did not declare moot a class action suit
brought by a single woman against the Texas criminal abortion laws even though the pregnancy
had terminated before the Court heard the case. The Court explained that if "termination ma[de]
a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage. . . . Our laws
shall not be that rigid. . . . Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of non-
mootness. It truly could be 'capable of repetion, yet evading review.'" 410 U.S. at 125 (quoting
Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). See generally Moore v. Ogilvie,
394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Carol v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-79 (1968); United States v.
W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
88 HARV. L. REv. 373, 378 (1974).
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court may render a valid judgment even in the absence of plaintiffs
standing. The cases correctly separate the defenses of lack of standing
and lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the legal question concerns
the effect of defendant's failure to raise timely the respective defenses.
When, as in Forsythe and Thurston, a plaintiff satisfies the policy con-
siderations underlying the standing doctrine, a court should be permit-
ted to proceed to the merits and render a valid judgment despite
plaintiff's lack of standing, if defendant fails to raise the issue prior to
judgment.62
This conclusion finds support by analogy to other subject matter ju-
risdiction requirements that defendant may waive if he fails to raise
them in a timely fashion. In Hartog v. Memory6" defendant challenged
a judgment against him on the ground that the trial court lacked diver-
sity jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim. Defendant first raised the issue
after the verdict, even though he testified at trial that he was a British
citizen. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the court of ap-
peals affirmed.' 4 The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that
plaintiff should have been given an opportunity to rebut defendant's
testimony prior to dismissal. 5 In addition, the Court held that when
the jurisdictional defect does not appear on the record, a court may-
but is not required to-dismiss the complaint; the rule that subject mat-
ter jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal applies only to
cases in which the defect appears on the record.6 On the facts of this
case, defendant's knowing and false identification of his citizenship in
the pleadings and his allowing the jurisdictional defect to pass unno-
ticed at trial estopped him from denying the jurisdiction of the court on
appeal.67
62. This view is consistent with the Supreme Court's conclusion in Frank v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), that the meaning and scope of all concepts of justiciability "must be
derived from the fundamental policies in forming the 'cases and controversies' limitations im-
posed by Article III." Id. at 754.
When a defendant does not appear at trial, however, he should be able to raise by direct appeal
all jurisdictional defects, including the plaintiffs lack of standing. See Continental Bank & Trust
Co. v. Lewis, Roca, Scoville & Beaucamp, 278 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1960); Wyman v. Newhouse, 93
F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937).
63. 116 U.S. 588 (1886).
64. 23 F. 835 (7th Cir. 1885).
65. 116 U.S. at 591-92. Accord, Huntington v. Ladley, 176 U.S. 668 (1900).
66. 116 U.S. at 591. Accord, American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
67. 116 U.S. at 592.
[Vol. 1979:501
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/8
"STANDING" AMENDMENT
The Hartog exception has been followed in a few recent cases.68 In
Di Frischia v. New York Central Railroad Company69 the parties stipu-
lated, immediately prior to a preliminary hearing on the jurisdictional
question, that the district court had jurisdiction. As a result, the court
did not hold the hearing, and instead entered an order that it had juris-
diction over the subject matter.70 Twenty-three months later-after the
completion of discovery and the running of the statute of limitations-
defendant moved to amend its answer in a way that would destroy the
court's diversity jurisdiction.71 The trial court granted the motion and
subsequently dismissed the complaint, but the court of appeals re-
versed, holding that "[a]Uowance of such an amendment under the cir-
cumstances would be an abuse of discretion."72 In reaching a similar
result, the court in Kreger v. Ryan Brothers, Inc. 7 found it "inappropri-
ate for a defendant to admit to the jurisdictional allegations of a Com-
plaint, to remain silent upon the defects in those allegations for more
than two years, and then to raise a jurisdictional defense upon the eve
of trial . . . particularly where defendant itself remains in exclusive
possession of the [relevant] facts."7 4 Similarly, in Greenbaum v. United
States7 5 the court did not allow the government to assert lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act76 after it had
allowed the statute of limitations to run.7 7
68. But see Miller v. Weller, 286 F.2d 172 (3d Cir. 1961); Shroeder v. Freeland, 188 F.2d 517
(8th Cir. 1951); Central States Co-ops v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 165 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1948),
vacated on other grounds, 337 U.S. 951 (1949); Associated Press v. Emmett, 45 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.
Cal. 1942).
69. 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960). See Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry., 22 F.R.D. 252 (W.D.
Pa. 1958). See also Young v. Handwork, 179 F.2d 70 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950);
Price v. Greenway, 167 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1948); Murphy v. Sun Oil Co., 86 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 683 (1936).
70. 279 F.2d at 142-43.
71. Id. at 143.
72. Id. at 144. Accord, Joyce v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 1242 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
73. 308 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
74. Id. at 728.
75. 360 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
76. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976).
77. Plaintiff was an employee of the United States Post Office. On his day off he went to the
post office where he worked to pick up his paycheck. While in the parking lot he suffered an
accident for which he brought suit. Five years after the employee filed a claim under the Federal
Torts Claim Act, the Government for the first time argued that the plaintiff sustained the injury in
the course of his employment and should therefore file under the Federal Employees Compensa-
tion Act; 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8151 (1976). The Government further argued that because the FECA,
precluded judicial review, the court lacked jurisdiction. The court noted, however, that plaintiff
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One could attempt to distinguish waiver of subject matter jurisdic-
tion in the above cases from waiver of standing on the ground that the
Constitution does not require Congress to vest the lower federal courts
with the full potential of subject matter jurisdiction,7" but the Constitu-
tion does mandate standing under the case-or-controversy requirement
of article three.7 9 On the other hand, article three criteria must still be
met for the proper exercise of subject matter jurisdiction even in cases
in which Congress provides for federal jurisdiction when no complete
diversity exists, 0 or when Congress imposes monetary limits on the ex-
ercise of article three jurisdiction."' Furthermore, Congress may not
grant jurisdiction to federal courts outside the limits of article three,8 2
nor may the federal courts exercise jurisdiction over cases that fall
outside article three parameters.8 3
Hartog and the other cases discussed above, however, illustrate that
courts have ignored what seem to be the minimum requirements of
article three. Thus, precedent exists for the waiver of subject matter
jurisdictional requirements when the defendant exhibits bad faith or
would be barred by FECA's statute of limitations from asserting a claim. 360 F. Supp. at 788
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 8128 (1970)). Thus, the Government "did not raise this defense. . . when an
administrative remedy was still possible, but waited until the fifth anniversary date had safely
passed." 360 F. Supp. at 789.
The district court also found that "[Tihe present case is not exactly on point with DiFrschia.
The Government has never stipulated to jurisdiction or to jurisdictional facts. The problem in this
action is the Government's long and unexcusable delay in discovering materials in its own posses-
sion which gave rise to the issue of FECA coverage." Id. at 787.
78. Compare U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 (nine categories of federal jurisdiction) with 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1332 (federal question and diversity jurisdiction). See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewa-
ter Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
It has never heretofore been doubted that the constitutional grant of power is broader
than the general federal question jurisdiction which Congress has from time to time
thought to confer on district courts by statute.
Id. at 614 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
79. See notes 2-6 supra and accompanying text.
80. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967). See generally Mississippi
Pub. Corp. v. Murphee, 326 U.S. 438 (1946); Chicago Great W. Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U.S. 94
(1924); Munter v. Neil Corset Co., 261 U.S. 276 (1923); Bekins v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 210
F.2d 338 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1015 (1954).
81. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. See, e.g., Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916); Vraney v.
Pirellas County, 250 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1958); Sturgeon v. Great Lakes Steele Corp., 143 F.2d 819
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944); Krisel v. Duncan, 258 F. Supp. 845 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd,
386 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1042 (1968); Jenn-Air Prods. Co. v. Penn Venti-
lator, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
82. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 303 (1809); United States v. Binn, 74
F. Supp. 603 (D. Or. 1947).
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permits the statute of limitations to elapse, leaving the plaintiff without
a remedy. 4 By analogy, therefore, a defendant who fails to challenge
plaintiff's standing before the court reaches the merits of the contro-
versy should not be allowed to assert later the court's lack of subject
matter jurisdiction to attack an otherwise valid judgment on the merits.
To permit a defendant to assert plaintiffs lack of standing postjudg-
ment places the defendant in a "no-lose" position. If plaintiff succeeds
on the merits at trial, defendant can avoid the judgment on appeal by
asserting plaintiff's lack of standing. If plaintiff loses on the merits at
trial, defendant then holds a res judicata determination against plaintiff
on the merits of the claim. In either case the defendant gains the bene-
fits of legal process without any corresponding risks of liability.
A corollary procedural question is whether the absence of standing
should be a basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. Generally, a
judgment rendered by a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction may
be collaterally attacked. 5 Collateral attacks on the integrity of a judg-
ment typically arise in two situations: first, where the defendant has
previously litigated the jurisdictional issue at trial or on direct appeal;
and second, where the defendant has not previously raised the issue.
The defendant who voluntarily appears and has the opportunity to
litigate the standing issue should be precluded from collaterally attack-
ing the judgment on the ground that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction; recourse for the defendant is available through direct ap-
peal.86 Because federal courts have jurisdiction to determine their own
jurisdiction,87 the judgment should be given full force and effect subject
84. Compare these cases with Dekrell v. Johnson, 404 F. Supp. 664 (E.D. Pa. 1975), in which
the court granted defendant-corporation's motion to dismiss for want of diversity jurisdiction even
though the statute of limitations had run. Although Dekrell represents the majority view on the
question of waiver of subject matter jurisdiction requirements, it may be distinguished from the
cases discussed in text. Defendant in Dekrell displayed no bad faith: it raised the jurisdictional
issue in its answer, id. at 666; and even though defendant filed its answer after the statute of
limitations had run, plaintiffs had prior notice of the jurisdictional defect, id. In addition, Dekrell
may be distinguished on the ground that dismissal in favor of the corporate defendant did not
leave plaintiffs without a remedy against an individual defendant named in the action. Id.
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 96 (1971).
86. See Chicot County Dist. v. Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1948); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938).
See also Somporter, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.4112] (2d ed. 1979).
87. See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); note
67 supra and accompanying text.
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only to direct appellate review."8 When the defendant, however, does
not appear to defend on the merits of the action, a judgment may be
collaterally attacked for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,8 9 because
"the policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata is outweighed by the
policy against permitting the court to act beyond its jurisdiction."9
In short, when a defendant has had the opportunity to litigate the
issue of standing in the trial court, he should not be permitted to raise
the issue for the first time on appeal either by direct or collateral attack
on the judgment. Although standing may be a requirement of subject-
matter jurisdiction, a federal court can render a valid judgment even
though the plaintiff lacks standing if the defendant fails to raise the
issue in a timely manner.
III. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT
Two sections of the present Federal Rules of Civil Procedure poten-
tially permit a defendant to raise the issue of lack of standing. Rule
12(b)(6) requires a plaintiff to state the essential elements of his claim
against the defendant.91 The motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) per-
forms the same function as the previously used general demurrer: the
movant admits the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint, but de-
nies their legal sufficiency.92 The motion will be granted only if it ap-
pears to a legal certainty that plaintiff is not entitled to relief.93
Rule 12(b)(6), however, does not provide an appropriate vehicle to
raise the lack of standing issue. Fast and its progeny make clear that
standing relates to the subject matter jurisdiction of a federal court, not
to the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's claim.94 A plaintiff who lacks
standing does not osojure fail to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. 95 Thus, rule 12(b)(6), because it is designed to test legal
88. See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); note
67 supra and accompanying text.
89. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942).
90. Id.
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
92. See 2A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE T 12.08 (2d ed. 1979).
93. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Marshal v. Spangler, 397 F. Supp. 200 (D. Va.
1975); Schmitt v. Crist, 333 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
94. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490 (1975); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 699 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 26
(1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1967); notes 9-25 supra and accompanying text.
95. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1967); American Med. Ass'n v. Mathews, 429 F.
Supp. 1179, 1189 (N.D. Ill. 1977). In DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973), although the
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sufficiency of a claim rather than the plaintiffs standing to assert the
claim, does not permit a defendant to challenge the plaintiff's standing.
Presently, the practitioner who wishes to raise the lack of standing
defense should do so pursuant to rule 12(b)(1), which provides that a
court shall dismiss any suit over which it lacks subject matter jurisdic-
tion.96 Under the Hartog exception, however, a court is not required to
dismiss a complaint when the defendant fails to raise the issue prior to
verdict and the absence of standing does not appear on the record.97 A
court might also ignore the defense even prior to verdict if the defend-
ant's delay in raising the issue severely prejudices the plaintiff.98
At the same time, the federal courts have not uniformly allowed de-
fendants to raise the standing issue at any point in the litigation, unlike
other defenses associated with subject matter jurisdiction. Forsythe, in
fact, supports the proposition that standing is not an element of subject
matter jurisdiction, or if so, that a defendant must raise the standing
issue in a timely fashion.99 Thurston also holds that a plaintiff who
litigates a case with "concrete adverseness," and thus satisfies the pri-
mary policy considerations underlying the standing requirement, will
not be subject to a defendant's standing challenge once a judgment has
been entered.' °°
Like rule 12(b)(6), therefore, rule 12(b)(1) lacks the clarity and scope
to provide an adequate means for defendants to challenge plaintiffs'
lack of standing. This situation calls for the amendment of rule 12(b)
to designate lack of standing as a separate defense and to indicate at
what point during the litigation process the failure by a defendant to
raise the defense should constitute a waiver of the defense.
Under the present Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12(h) sets
out the time frame for defenses to be raised by motion or responsive
pleading. 0 1 Under 12(h)(1) a defendant waives the defenses of lack of
jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, insufficiency of process,
court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, it implied that had a different plaintiff asserted
the claim the court would have heard the dispute. Id. at 1150-51.
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l).
97. See notes 63-67 supra and accompanying text.
98. See notes 69-79 supra and accompanying text.
99. See notes 52-56 supra and accompanying text.
100. See notes 57-61 supra and accompanying text.
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h) provides:
(1) A defense of lack ofjurisdiction over the person, improper venue, insufficiency of
process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived (A) if omitted from a motion in
the circumstances described in subdivision (g), or (B) if it is neither made by motion
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and insufficiency of service of process if he does not raise them in his
answer or first motion to the court. Defendants, under 12(h)(2), may
raise defenses based upon failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted and failure to join an indispensable party as late as
trial on the merits. The defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
however, may be raised at any time under 12(h)(3).
In the present scheme of rule 12(h), those defenses that must be
raised at the earliest stage are those most apparent or discoverable from
the inception of the litigation. Defenses that relate to lack of personal
jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficient process, and insufficient serv-
ice of process are, in the main, statutorily defined. Because a diligent
defendant may easily discover and rely upon statutes that specifically
govern personal jurisdiction, venue, and process, it is not unreasonable
to require these defenses to be raised in defendant's first responsive
pleading. Furthermore, none of these defenses go to the substantive
merits of a plaintiffs claim. Nor does the waiver of these defenses en-
courage collusion between the parties to confer jurisdiction on the fed-
eral courts because the parties may choose to litigate a claim in any
federal court that is competent to hear it. A defendant who acquiesces
in the plaintiffs choice of forum or to service of process, therefore,
should not be heard to object once he has begun to litigate the merits of
the claim.
Lack of standing differs from these defenses in a number of respects.
First, standards for standing are not well defined by statute. Nor have
the courts clearly enunciated the requirements for standing in every
situation-the Supreme Court's standing cases vary in outcome accord-
ing to the type of plaintiff.'l" A defendant could, in good faith, believe
at the time of answer that plaintiff has standing, only to discover the
defect later in the litigation. Thus, a defendant should not be expected
to either raise or waive this defense at this early stage.'0 3 More impor-
under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereof permit-
ted by Rule 15(a) to be made as a matter of course.
(2) A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a defense
of failure to join a party indispensable under Rule 19, and an objection of failure to state
a legal defense to a claim may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule
7(a), or by motion for judgment on the pleading, or at the trial on the merits.
(3) Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.
102. See notes 32-37 supra and accompanying text.
103. If, however, courts consistently required plaintiffs to affirmatively allege standing rather
than relied upon defendants to point out lack of standing, defendants might then be called upon to
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tantly, standing, unlike the defenses that a defendant waives at the
threshold of the suit for failure to assert them, affects the competency of
the court to hear the controversy. It would be constitutionally unfair,
therefore, to require a defendant to raise a standing challenge at the
outset of the litigation.'t 4
On the other end of the waiver spectrum in current rule 12(h), the
policies underlying the standing doctrine do not justify identical treat-
ment of the standing and subject matter jurisdiction defenses. The
standing requirement is designed to insure that the plaintiff will present
the issues with concrete adverseness."t 5 If a plaintiff has presented the
case in such a manner as to raise issues of fact that require the court to
render a verdict, the fundamental purpose of the standing requirement
has been fulfilled. Certainly, it would be an anomaly to maintain that a
plaintiff who has won a verdict did not present the case with sufficient
vigor. As a result, even though standing may be an element of a court's
subject matter jurisdiction, it makes little sense to treat standing as a
defense that can be raised at any time.
The logical approach dictates an amendment to rule 12(b) to make
lack of standing a defense separate from the general defense of lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Rule 12(h) should also be amended to re-
quire a defendant to raise any defense based on the plaintiff's lack of
standing prior to judgment. Plaintiff's interest, or lack thereof, should
surface during discovery, and certainly, a defendant should be aware of
raise the defense in the pleadings stage. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for example, re-
quires persons who wish to intervene in licensing proceedings to demonstrate standing at the earli-
est stage in the proceeding. See 10 C.F.R. 2.714(a) (1978). See also Albert, Standing to Challenge
4dministratie Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claims for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 444-50
(1974). If the intervenor cannot demonstrate an interest that may be affected, then he is precluded
from participation in the hearing even though he may be prepared to present the issues with all
the vigor that the standing doctrine seeks to ensure. See Admin. Proc. Act § 6 (a), 4 U.S.C. § 1005
(a) (1964); Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies and Arbitrators, 81
HARV. L. REv. 721 (1968); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1669, 1728-30 (1975). Inasmuch as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require plaintiffs
to plead subject matter jurisdiction, of which standing is technically an element, an alternative
similar to that used by the NRC might appear reasonable. The NRC procedures, however, set out
the specific information that the intervenor must plead, 10 C.F.R. 2.471(a), while the courts have
not clearly enunciated these requirements, see notes 32-37 supra and accompanying text. Conse-
quently, the NRC procedures probably are not adaptable to the federal courts because plaintiffs
may not be on notice of what they would be required to show.
104. This factor also argues against the alternative proposed in the previous footnote. Unlike
administrative proceedings, the Constitution requires that plaintiffs have standing to sue in the
federal courts.
105. See notes 9-40 supra and accompanying text.
Number 2]
Washington University Open Scholarship
518 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the plaintiffs ability to present the case in an adversary and concrete
manner by the end of trial. Failure to raise the defense prior to judg-
ment also should constitute a waiver of the issue even if the defect ap-
pears on the record.
The proposed amendment to rule 12(h) also should allow a court on
its own motion to dismiss a complaint for lack of standing. The Consti-
tution requires standing to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts, and standing-regardless of the point at which waiver
occurs-remains important to the effective presentation of the merits of
a dispute. In addition, a court must be able to guard against collusion
by the parties to invoke its jurisdiction. Thus, a court should be al-
lowed to dismiss a suit for lack of standing prior to judgment, even
though the parties fail to raise the issue.
Arguably, the proposed amendment might entail a few drawbacks,
but none justify its rejection. First, one might argue that by highlight-
ing lack of standing as a separate defense, defendants may raise the
issue routinely, forcing the courts to become immersed in the standing
quagmire in nearly every case. Defendants might also use the defense
as a dilatory tactic to the detriment of already clogged court calendars.
The potential burden on the courts, however, is insignificant in light of
the constitutional significance of the standing doctrine and the policies
supporting the proposed amendment. Because standing is a constitu-
tional prerequisite to the proper exercise of subject matter jurisdiction,
courts should, as a matter of course, determine early in the litigation
whether the plaintiff has standing. In addition, plaintiffs should have
notice early in the litigation of their standing prior to the expenditure
of large sums of time and money in the litigation effort. More impor-
tantly, once a plaintiff has successfully litigated a controversy, no policy
reasons support vacating the judgment for lack of standing; if the
standing requirement is designed to ensure that a plaintiff will present
the issues in a concrete manner, then the underlying policy is not ad-
vanced by dismissing a judgment that plaintiff has successfully pur-
sued.
A second potential problem stems from the judiciary's reluctance to
render advisory opinions or to permit plaintiffs to litigate the rights of
nonparties."°6 If, as in Thurston,'107 a court permits a plaintiff who lacks
106. See Pugh, The Federal Declaratory Remedy: Justiciabillty, Jurisdiction and Related
Problems, 6 VAND. L. REV. 79, 93 (1952). See also Tushnet, supra note 8, at 677.
107. In Thurston, for example, the plaintiff who successfully challenged the city's suspension
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standing to litigate a claim, the judgment rendered will be advisory in
the sense that it will have no direct effect on the named plaintiff. Also,
the defendant will have a judicial determination of his rights and liabil-
ities with respect to the issues litigated without incurring any actual
liability to the plaintiff who brought the suit. If, in fact, no person
would have standing, the court's decision will be only a response to a
hypothetical controversy. Thurston, however, illustrates the inappro-
priateness of a blanket rule against advisory opinions and the litigation
of third-party rights when the issues of the case have been argued ade-
quately by the plaintiff and the court has determined the merits in
plaintiff's favor. When the plaintiff satisfies the policy considerations
underlying the standing doctrine and the defendant fails to raise the
lack of standing defense until judgment has been rendered, judicial
economy does not support the relitigation of the same issues merely
because of a procedural technicality that no longer serves a substantive
purpose.
A final concern relates to the res judicata effect of a judgment en-
tered in a case in which the plaintiff lacked standing.'10  Questions arise
in two situations. First, if suit A results in a judgment for defendant
against a plaintiff who did not have standing, is a nonparty with inter-
ests similar to the plaintiff-but with standing-bound by that judg-
ment in suit B? According to the general rule, the plaintiff in suit B
would not be bound by any res judicata effect of the judgment in suit
A. I"9 Second, if suit A ends in a judgment for a plaintiff who did not
have standing, is the defendant bound by the judgment in suit B
brought against him by plaintiffs who do meet the standing require-
ment? According to the mutuality of estoppel rule, the defendant
would not be bound by the judgment because the plaintiffs in suit B
were not parties to suit A. 0
and dismissal rules received no benefits from the court's judgment. See notes 57-61 supra and
accompanying text.
108. For a general discussion of the res judicata effect of judgments, see 1B MooRE's FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 10.411[1] (2d ed. 1979).
109. See Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill., 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Transp. Co., 261 N.Y. 159, 184 N.E. 744
(1933). See also Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Assoc., 19 Cal. 2d 87, 122 P.2d 892
(1942).
110. See RESTATMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 83-92 (1942).
The doctrine of mutuality, however, has been limited. Id See Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust & Sav. Assoc., 19 Cal. 2d 87, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), in which Justice Traynor triggered the
demise of the mutuality doctrine and suggested an alternative test that has set the trend for deter-
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Although the judgment may not be binding on res judicata grounds
in either situation, the stare decisis effect of the judgment in suit A will,
in all likelihood, determine the merits of suit B to the extent that suit A
litigated the same issues. In Thurston, for example, the court noted that
the primary reason for allowing the case to proceed to judgment even
in the absence of a plaintiff with standing was the possibility that other
persons with standing would initiate identical challenges if the court
dismissed the present suit. In cases in which the interests of nonparties
are not identical with those of the named plaintiff, however, the judg-
ment should not terminate the rights of nonparties; the need for, and
fairness of, holding the judgment conclusive against the nonparties
does not outweigh the need to grant nonparties their "day in court."
The permutations that might arise from the application of the res
judicata and stare decisis doctrines in a single fact situation are too
numerous to explore in this article." 'I In general, judgments should not
be binding on nonparties, but courts should use their discretion to ex-
amine each case to determine whether this rule would produce an un-
fair result.
IV. CONCLUSION
A judgment rendered in a case in which the plaintiff lacked standing
to sue is valid and should not be subject to direct or collateral attack.
Because standing, however, falls within rule 12(b)(1)'s treatment of
subject matter jurisdiction, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pres-
ently allow a defendant to move to dismiss a suit after an adverse ver-
dict merely because plaintiff did not meet the technical standing
requirements. Rule 12(b) should be amended to make lack of standing
a separate defense, and rule 12(h) should be similarly amended to re-
sult in waiver of this defense after a trial on the merits. This amend-
mining when ajudgment should be conclusive. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University
of II1., 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Pennington v. Snow, 471 P.2d 370 (Alaska 1970); Eisen v. Columbia
Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mass. 1960); DeWitt v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.W.2d 195
(1967).
111. For a more detailed discussion, see Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53
CALIF. L. REv. 25 (1965); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel-Limits of the Bernhard Doc-
trine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957); Note, The Impact of Defensive and Offensive.Assertions of Collat.
eralEstoppel byaNonparty, 35 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 1010 (1967); Comment, The Collateral Estop.
pel Effect f/Prior State Court Findings in Cases Within Exclusive FederalJurisdiction, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1978).
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ment accommodates the reasonable interests of all parties and reflects
the complexities and policies underlying the standing requirement.
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